Vertical integration of computing facilities, a transaction cost approach by Piptea, Michael & Pieptea, Dan
Journal of International Information Management
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 7
1992
Vertical integration of computing facilities, a
transaction cost approach
Michael Piptea
Iris Systems
Dan Pieptea
Illinois State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/jiim
Part of the Management Information Systems Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of International
Information Management by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Piptea, Michael and Pieptea, Dan (1992) "Vertical integration of computing facilities, a transaction cost approach," Journal of
International Information Management: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/jiim/vol1/iss1/7
Vertical Integration of Computing Facilities Journal of International Information Management 
Vertical integration of computing 
facilities, a transaction cost approach 
Michael Pieptea 
Iris Systems 
Dan Pieptea 
Illinois State University 
ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a generalized model for computing capacity by identifying the main 
activities in a computer facility as formal transactions. The formal transactions carried out in 
a computing environment are characterized along two dimensions: freqency of occurrence 
and idiosyncrasy of assets. Vfe make recommendations as to how these formal transactons 
should be executed - across markets, internally or using intermediate forms of governance. 
It is shown that transactions in a computing facility fall into one of three categories: procure­
ment of assets, maintenance and modification of assets, and collection, storage and process­
ing of data into information. Formal transactions in a computing facility such as procurement 
of application software, recruiting for different positions, data entry and transformation of 
data into information are discussed in detail. The efficiency of possible forms of governance 
is analyzed for each formal transaction. Generalized efficiency criteria for the market approach 
versus managerial control are provided. The conclusions find an application in defining the 
boundaries of end-user computing as well as other computing facilities such as data centers. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the greatest challenges of business-oriented computing facilities is to increase per­
sonal and organizational productivity while responding to the ever-changing business condi­
tions. Most traditional computing facilities face difficulties that prevent them from providing 
a fast service to the end user. These difficulties are seldom solved by placing com]auter resources 
under the direct management of the end user. 
In this paper we argue that one of the major causes for the traditional ineffiiciency of com­
puter centers is vertical over-integration. We evaluate the degree to which a conrputing facility 
should be vertically integrated. Activities in a data center such as procurement of application 
software, recruiting, data entry, data processing and others, are viewed as generalized tran­
sactions in the sense of the transaction cost economic theory. We identify and characterize 
the formal transactions carried out in a computing environment along two dimensions, fre­
quency of occurrence and idiosyncrasy of the investment under uncertainty. We recommend 
ways in which these formal transactions can be efficiently executed - across markets, internal­
ly, or using intermediate forms of governance. Our conclusions have a direct application in 
defining the boundaries of end-user computing. We feel that greater flexibhit)'^ of computing 
power can be achieved by employing economic principles of the transaction cost theory in 
the process of organizing a computing facility. 
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THE FRAMEWORK 
Transaction cost economics is defined by Oliver Williamson (1979) as an "interdisciplinary 
undertaking that joins economics with aspects of organization theory and overlaps extensive­
ly with contract law." As Ronald Coase (1937) shows, markets and firms are alternative means 
of completing a related set of transactions. Contracting out (the market approach) and 
managerial authority represent two competing alternatives for organizing transactions. In this 
setting, the firm presents itself as a set of contractual relationships. The ideal boundaries of 
the firm are such that total transaction costs are minimized. We argue that the concept can 
be extended to the departmental level, in this case a computing facility. Under competition, 
the choice between markets and hierarchies is driven by efficiency, given that uncertainty of 
outcome and opportimistic behavior increase the cost of using markets. Oliver Williamson 
(1975) shows that bounded rationality (i.e., the inability to define aU futiure states in a transac­
tional relation) and the tendency to opportunistic behavior (due to the small number of par­
ties involved in an exchange) make costs of enforcing contracts eventually prohibitively high 
and thus market governance to fail and be replaced by hierarchies. Later, Ian Macneil (1978) 
and William Ouchi (1980) describe additional forms of governance and insist on the existence 
of intermediate modes of organizing exchanges. 
The most fruitful level of analysis of the vertical integration issue, is not the organization, 
but the transaction (Barney and Ouchi, 1986). In order to establish the boundaries of an 
organization, each transaction within the organization must be analyzed. Depending upon 
the characteristics of the transactions, one can decide upon the most efficient way to carry 
out the pertinent activities. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSACTIONS 
Three dimensions characterize a transaction: frequency of occurrence, the degree to which 
an asset employed in the transaction (or the investment) is idiosyncratic and uncertainty of 
outcome. Frequency of occurrence may be classified as occasional or recurring. Assets involv­
ed in a transaction can be firm-specific, mixed and non firm-specific. In this paper we use 
the terms firm-specific asset, idiosyncratic investment, and idiosyncratic asset interchangeably. 
Idiosyncratic investments are in essence non-marketable investments. They occur in conjunc­
tion with non-transferable, specialized designs. The third dimension, uncertainty, is always 
present to a certain degree. 
FORMS OF GOVERNANCE 
Market governance uses as instrument the classical coritract, where identity of parties in­
volved in the transaction is considered meaningless, the nature of the agreement is precisely 
delimited and consequences of nonperformance fairly predictable from the very beginning 
(Macneil, 1978). Trilateral governance, also known as neo-classical contracting, brings in third 
party assistance to resolve possible disputes. Neo-classical contract law stems from the 
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admittance that given the conditions of bounded rationality and opportunistic biehavior, there 
is a need for both parties to trust the equity mecharusm in order to make the transaction work. 
Bilateral governance steps in when two parties develop a long-term relationship maintained 
by transaction specific economies. In that case, the relationship may become increasingly of 
administrative type. Bilateral governance is fueled by hazardous reliance on market condi­
tions and the possibility of recovering together specialized costs. Unified governance of the 
exchange happens when the transaction is organized internally, as is the case of in-house ap­
plication development. Vertical integration replaces the market mechanism with the ad­
ministrative authority. 
GENERALIZED MODEL FOR COMPUTING FACILITIES 
Business computing facilities, ranging from computer centers to workstations, are in the 
business of providing the end-user with information by executing a series of formal transac­
tions and employing various assets. In developing a generalized model for computing capaci­
ty, we construct on the work of Oliver Williamson (1979) who matches governance structures 
to transactions. His system of classify transactions is described in Fig. 1. 
Figure 1. The Williamson Framework: Matching Formal Transactions 
with Governance Structures 
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For transactions that involve non-specific assets, frequency of recurrence does not matter, 
and market governance (classical contract) is recommended. The closer to air idiosyncratic 
investment an occasional transaction requires, the more appropriate a trilateral governance. 
Bilateral forms of governance are recommended for recurrent transactions that reiiuire customiz­
ed assets and unified governance (pure verfical integration) is appropriate for recurrent tran­
sactions utilizing highly idiosyncratic assets. 
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The purer forms of governance, i.e., market and the unified structure are less sensitive 
to uncertainty. Under pressure of uncertainty, bilateral governance tends to become a unified 
structure. Some trilateral relationships evolve into market contracts by simplification of 
transactions. 
In our generalized model for computing capacity, we identify and analyze the assets first 
and the transactions second. In a computing environment we distinguish four categories of 
assets: data, hardware and system software, application software and human resources. The 
data is the most perishable asset of all. Data can be firm non-specific (e.g., stock quotes) but 
most often is a firm-specific asset. Hardware and system software, in most cases, are not 
idiosyncratic investments. Sometimes, specialized equipment may be unique to the firm, like 
certain data acquisition devices, but in general business computing hardware is a non-specific 
asset to the firm. 
A computing facility runs a portfolio of application software that has a fairly wide range 
of firm specificity. Some of the applications are firm-specific to a great extent, other are in­
dustry specific, while some others have a low degree of firm specificity. Among the latter are 
financial systems. In general, we see firm specificity increase when going from Transaction 
Processing Systems (TPS) to Structxured Decision Systems (SDS) and further to Decision Sup­
port Systems (DSS) (Pieptea and Anderson, 1987). 
Human resources in a computing environment cover a range of firm specificity, in many 
cases related to the other assets that they are involved with. Listed in decreasing order of firm 
specificity, human resources in the data center are the manager, the information analyst, the 
system designer and the programmer. However, exceptions from this order exist: a maintenance 
programmer assigned on a firm-specific peice of application software is closer to the firm than 
a development programmer. We shall elaborate later on this idea. 
Transactions executed in a computing facility fall into one of the three major categories: 
(1) procurement of assets, (2) maintenance and modification of assets, and (3) collection, 
storage and processing of data into information. 
Procurement of hardware and system software is usually a non-recurring transaction in­
volving non firm-specific assets. One may think of a very specialized piece of equipment to 
be developed in house, but generally the business community goes to the market for executing 
this type of transactions and thus, reality validates the model. 
Procurement of application software is typically a set of non-recurring transactions involving 
resotrrces of a wide range of firm specificity. Thus, according to the model, it makes more 
sense to buy (or lease) a piece of financial software (low firm specificity) and have it installed 
by a consulting firm rather than develop the software in house. On the other hand, internal 
resources are better utilized in a highly idiosyncratic development effort. Here the model can 
serve as a useful guide. Too many times software procurement is synonymous to software 
development. At the other extreme, consulting firms are hired for what in essence is an open-
ended project. In many cases, by reasonably simplifying requirements, one can find market 
solutions to what looks like an internal development. Customization of packaged software 
can be successfully accomplished using a long-term relationship (trilateral or bilateral form 
of governance). Firm-specific application software should be developed internally (unified 
governance). 
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Procurement of human resources is, in general, an occasional transaction, unless there 
is a severe turnover problem. Programming and system design staff is less firm specific than 
information analysts and management personnel. We emphasize the programming function 
since it presents the most diverse features. We distinguish the development programmer from 
the maintenance programmer as two different positions. Because the line between the analysis 
and programming in maintenance is quite fuzzy (most of the time assignments are a com­
bination of business system analysis and coding), the maintenance programmer is in general 
more firm-specific than the development programmer. 
There are a number of alternative paths for procurement of human resources. The market 
alternative is provided by personnel agencies (headhunters) and use of contractors while the 
in-house path is represented by the use of the internal persormel department, piersonnel search 
conducted at the MIS department level or providing data processing training to potential in-
ternal candidates. For the procurement of a maintenance programmer we recommend a long­
time relationship with a placement agency. The development programmer on the other hand, 
with stronger ties to the technology, is almost non firm-specific. This statement is validated 
by the relatively high turnover rate of the more technical programming staff. For development 
projects, with well defined specifications and timetable, contract programm(;rs offer a more 
efficient alternative. The information system designer is technology specific tliough less than 
the development programmer. The information analyst and the manager are firm-specific assets 
and their development should be internally organized. 
Maintenance and modification of hardware and system software should be and usually 
is executed over the market (the maintenance contract). Note that extremely short time allow­
ed to fbc potentially recurring problems (system crashes, certain on-line or real time system 
failures) increase the idiosyncrasy to the point that it justifies the presence of a permanently 
employed technical expert ("guru") on the premises. In many cases this person is known as 
system programmer. 
Maintenance and modification of non firm-specific applications is recommended to be 
carried across markets or bilateral forms of governance. For example, the installation and light 
customization of a new release of a market General Ledger product should be done with con­
sultants. Too much customization of a packaged software product may create; important pro­
blems. Once in production, the degree of firm specificity of an application changes. Because 
of the urgency of production-related problems, application software maintenance is fit to be 
organized internally. Highly specialized applications should be definitely maintained in house. 
The model suggests that training for information management and analyst should be organized 
internally, while training should be contracted out. 
Data collection is most often a recurring process. It usually employs non-specific assets, 
which is why many companies contract out their needs to external keying seirvices. If, on the 
other hand, very specialized resources are needed, the data collection transaction is at home 
within the boundaries of the organization. Since the data itself is a highly firm-specific asset, 
its storage is a transaction that should be executed internally, rendering the maintenance of 
the database an important departmental function. 
Data processing, driven by the recurrence argument and the firm specifiicity of the data, 
is to be carried out mostly in house. Occasional processing like disaster recovery planning 
should be done and is eventually done over the market. On an application basis, those ap­
plications that are non firm-specific could be eventually farmed out to service bureaus. Cap­
turing the information on paper or screens shoudl be done internally and under proper security 
measures. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper approaches the different activities that take place in a computing environment 
from the transaction cost economics point of view. We identify and characterize the formal 
transactions in a computing organization along two dimensions, frequency of occurrence and 
idiosyncrasy of the assets employed in the transaction, and study the impact of uncertainty. 
We make recommendations as to how these formal transactions should be executed - across 
markets, internally or using intermediate forms of governance. The following summarizes our 
conclusions: 
The end-user should be very selective in choosing what formal transactions related to com­
puting he/she wants to bring under closer control. End-user computing stands a good chance 
to be plagued by inefficiently run activities, if it assumes the responsibility of carrymg out 
high cost transactions. Only firm-specific and/or highly firm-specific applications belong imder 
close control of the end-user. One way to improve the service offered by traditional computing 
facilities is to re-think operations in light of the transaction cost economics theory. Cost effi­
ciency can be considerably improved if these principles are employed in the day-to-day prac­
tice of data center management. 
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